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Abstract 
The paper discusses pro and cons concerning the hypothesis of a distinctive 
European approach regarding its automotive system. Its aim is to develop an 
international comparison of the structural changes in the international automo-
tive industry. A special focus is laid on the ways of coordinating competencies 
and knowledge. What are the differences that set the European industry apart 
from its North American and Japanese competitors in this regard? The paper 
discusses EU market characteristics and particularities of the European de-
mand structures, the history of specific European approaches in the area of 
production systems and new forms of work and the recent changes of supplier 
relations since the 1990s. The analysis shows that the approach taken in the 
course of the restructuring of the supplier industry in Europe led to the devel-
opment of specific capabilities related to cross company and interorganisational 
cooperation in the 1990s which partially explains the successful development of 
the European auto industry in recent time. 
Zusammenfassung 
Das Paper diskutiert das Für und Wider der Hypothese eines besonderen euro-
päischen Entwicklungsweges in der Automobilindustrie. Ziel ist, die gegenwärti-
gen Umstrukturierungen dieser Industrien mit einer international vergleichenden 
Perspektive zu erfassen. Im Zentrum steht die Frage nach der Koordination von 
Kompetenzen und Wissen: Welche Unterschiede lassen sich hier im Vergleich 
der europäischen Industrie mit der in Nordamerika und Japan feststellen? Die 
Untersuchung zeigt, dass insbesondere hinsichtlich der Reorganisation der Zu-
lieferbeziehungen ein besonderer europäischer Ansatz entwickelt wurde, der 
zur Herausbildung spezifischer Formen der unternehmensübergreifenden und 
interorganisationalen Kooperation geführt hat. Die damit verbundenen Lernpro-
zesse haben zu spezifisch europäischen Konzepten und Kompetenzen geführt, 
die wesentlich zu der relativ erfolgreichen Entwicklung des Automobilsektors in 
Europa in den vergangenen Jahren beigetragen haben. 
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1. Introduction* 
The European Car Industry has had a strong start into the new century. After 
three problem-ridden previous decades, this is somewhat surprising. Only ten 
years ago, the Japanese auto industry seemed invincible, the 1980s saw the 
French and Italian car industries on their knees, and in the 1990s the German 
car companies scrambled to regain competitiveness. By the year 2000, the 
Europeans seem to have re-invented themselves. They were the ones to open 
the new round of mergers & acquisitions. As a result, the US car industry is no 
longer the Big Three after the takeover of Chrysler by Daimler, and two of the 
Japanese Big Five now belong to alliances dominated by European car compa-
nies. Admittedly, it is not all roses within the European car industry. This is for 
instance indicated by the increasing difficulties of Fiat. In addition, the European 
resurgence may be owed to protectionist factors (such as the 10% tariff on cars 
imported to the EU versus 2.5% for passenger cars and 25% (!) for light trucks 
in the case of the USA and 0% in Japan1). However, some of the credit can be 
ascribed to good decision-making of European management and to differences 
in the approach the Europeans have taken vis-à-vis the restructuring of the 
automotive system. What might some of these differences be that set the Euro-
pean industry apart from its North American and Japanese rivals?  
There certainly are characteristic features, which support the hypothesis of a 
European distinctiveness: 
– institutional conditions, industry policies of the EU and its member states, 
industrial relation systems, tax policies, environmental regulations; 
– the customer structure in terms of social characteristics, income, tastes re-
flecting for instance geographical particularities, structures of urbanisation; 
– the industry structure in terms of OEM supplier, small and big company 
configurations. 
On the other hand, a number of factors speak against the hypothesis of Euro-
pean distinctiveness: 
                                            
* This paper is based on research carried out at the Social Science Research Cen-
ter Berlin (WZB) in the context of a research programme on Coordinating Compe-
tencies and Knowledge in the European Automobile System (CoCKEAS) between 
2000 and 2002. The CoCKEAS Programme was part of the work activities of the 
international network of automotive industry researchers, GERPISA, and it was fi-
nanced by the European Union in its framework 5 programme (cf. Lung 2001). I 
am very grateful for all comments made in the context of the CoCKEAS and 
GERPISA activities. I would like to thank in particular Paul Bailey, Bruce Bel-
zowski, Michel Freyssenet, Yannick Lung, Glenn Mercer, Anne Posthuma, Mari 
Sako, Mario Salerno, Takahiro Fujimoto and Koichi Shimokawa for their thoughtful 
and productive comments on the previous versions of the paper. I would also like 
to thank Peter Jansen for his help in compiling this report. As usual, any errors 
and lacks of clarity remain the responsibility of the author. The paper will also be 
published in forthcoming issues of the Actes du GERPISA, and, in a shortened 
version, in the International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management. 
1 Cf. Jama (2001: 24). 
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– For a long time now, American companies have had a strong presence in 
Europe. The Japanese automakers have followed, and since recently 
stepped up pace to increase production inside Europe.2 Thus, today around 
1/3 of the European automotive activities are being governed from outside. 
At least for the American manufacturers, however, it is also true that they 
have been part of the European automotive system for such a long time 
that their factories and practices in many respects more resemble those of 
their European competitors than their own organisation in the USA. 
– Many of the paradigmatic concepts in the automotive industry are of Non-
European origin. This is true for Fordism as well as Toyotism (lean produc-
tion) and for all areas reaching from production organisation, to supplier re-
lations and product development. 
This paper discusses the pros and cons concerning the hypothesis of a distinc-
tive European automotive system. The interest is not to develop a new (Euro-
pean) system. Rather the question is what is specific about the European sys-
tem from an international perspective. Is there a specific approach to co-
ordinating competencies and knowledge? If this is the case, which measures 
should be taken to foster trends, modify elements of the approach, provide sup-
ports and enable actors? 
The term “automotive system” encompasses three types of actors: (1) up-
stream actors – suppliers of systems, modules and parts, resp. intellectual ser-
vices (R&D, design, conception, industrial engineering); (2) central actors: the 
original equipment maker (OEM, i.e. the actual carmakers; and (3) the down-
stream actors: distribution, financial services, repair and after sales services. 
The automotive system is embedded in a system of institutions and shaped by 
regulations and policies on a national or supranational level.  
Considering the size of Europe, or even of the European Union and the 
enormous differences between its countries and regions, treating Europe as a 
whole, certainly is a daunting assumption3. There are huge differences between 
the European countries, and the high degree of “diversity” can be seen as a 
distinct European characteristic. At the same time, Europe increasingly devel-
                                            
2 The European production by Japanese Automakers increased from 100.000 units 
(1987) to 1 million units (2000) and half of the production is realized in the UK. 
(Jama 2001: 15) R&D centres are created in various member states of the Euro-
pean Union (Germany, UK, Spain, and France).  
3 The European Union constitutes the economic core of Europe. With 370 Million 
inhabitants the “single market” constitutes the biggest market bloc in the world. It 
accounts for about a sixth of total global trade in goods (even excluding intra-
community trade. This is more than its main partners and competitors, the United 
States and Japan. Free trade agreements (European Economic Area) promote 
and maintain trade links between the European Union and its neighbouring coun-
tries. Lastly there are free trade agreements with the central and east European 
countries – Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republics, Slovenia, Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania (cf. European Commission 2002a: 
8f.). When the EU enlargement is completed, about 170 Million new “consumers” 
will be integrated into the single market. 
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ops its own identity with distinct institutions, regulations and policies. Thus, one 
of the questions of the following is what influence European level policies have 
on the development of the automobile industry in Europe. Does a European 
automobile policy exist at all? 
The structure of the paper is as follows: The next section (2) discusses the 
question of a European level automobile policy: is there such a policy, what ob-
jectives and points of emphasis does it have? Market characteristics and par-
ticularities of the European demand structures will be discussed briefly in sec-
tion 3. Section 4 deals with alternative production systems, new forms of work 
and employee participation, i.e. areas in which Europe has sought to differenti-
ate itself for a long time. Section 5 assesses changes in supplier relations since 
the 1990s, particularly the tendencies of specialisation related to outsourcing 
and modularization. Section 6 discusses implications of the new supplier struc-
tures for coordination and cooperation across company borders in the area of 
production, development and with regional networks of small and medium com-
panies. Finally, some conclusions will be presented in section 7. 
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2. European Level Automobile Policy 
It is only since the mid-1990s that one can speak of a coherent European-level 
automobile policy. In 1981, as a reaction to the oil crisis, the European Com-
mission formulated its first statement on the European automobile industry ex-
pressing the need for a closer cooperation in the industry, of increased invest-
ments, the stimulation of R&D and a policy, which favours the structurally weak 
areas in Europe. In particular, regarding the R&D efforts, the Commission urged 
a closer cooperation between the European companies signalling its interest to 
develop a specific European automotive system. 
During the 1980s, the main focus of the Commission was on state aid pro-
vided to the national industry in order to cope with the increased competition 
and the impact of the oil crisis. Between 1977 and 1987, member states granted 
an estimated amount of 26bn ECU to the EC motor vehicle producers (Dancet/ 
Rosenstock 1995: 2). In 1988, the Commission published a memorandum, 
which for the first time set a policy framework on the issue of state aid for the 
automotive sector. 
In view of the 1992 deadline for the completion of the single market and the 
perceived lack of competitiveness vis-à-vis the Japanese competition, the next 
major focus of the EU was on European competitiveness. An action paper of 
the European Commission addressed the external (the “volet externe”) and the 
internal (“volet interne”) dimension of the competitiveness issue. The volet ex-
terne was implemented via the voluntary agreement (“elements of consensus”) 
between MITI and the EC in 1991 regulating a gradual opening up of the Euro-
pean market to Japanese imports until 1999 and providing green light for Japa-
nese transplants (up to 1.2 million cars). The volet interne was specified in the 
1992 sector plan for the industry. 
In the meantime, in 1991, the industry itself finally had settled its internal 
differences regarding its EU-level industry representation. In this year, the As-
sociation des Constructeurs Européennes d’Automobile (ACEA) was estab-
lished, which now represents all European carmakers including the American 
manufacturers operating in Europe. 
In 1995 the Commission ordered a comprehensive review of the sectoral 
framework.4 
In its strategy paper on the automotive industry (cf. EU Bulletin 7/8-1996) 
the Commission stated its intent to create an appropriate framework for the im-
provement of the competitiveness of the European car industry by: 
– supporting R&D and training measures (a research programme on the “car 
of tomorrow”, the role of the car in a multi modal traffic system, the support 
of applications for electronic data transmission, the programme of occupa-
tional training, etc.; 
                                            
4 At this point, a major policy concern was the distribution system based on the 
block exemption stated by the European Union ten years ago. In a modified form, 
the block exemption was prolonged until 2002. 
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– strengthening the European motor vehicle industry’s market presence vis-à-
vis third countries; 
– type approval of motor vehicles and their components; 
– modernising the regulatory framework in the areas of taxation, safety and 
emissions; 
– setting up a “dialogue group” of representatives of the manufacturers, sup-
pliers, trade unions, users and European institutions (European Commis-
sion 1997). 
Figure 1: Milestones in the development of an EU automobile policy 
Year Policy Statement Goals 
1981/83 “Commission Statement” on the 
European Automobile Industry 
+ action paper 
• Closer cooperation in the industry 
(especially R&D) 
• improving the productivity 
• control of state aid 
1988/90 
 
 
 
 
 
Memorandum of the Commis-
sion + new action plan  
Volet interne: 
• Framework for state aid 
• Improving competitiveness 
• Strict control of state aid 
• Increase of R&D activities 
• Foster social dialogue 
Volet externe: 
• Restrict imports from Japan and 
Japanese transplants into Europe 
1995 Task force “Car of tomorrow” • Research co-operation between 
European companies 
• Focus on clean cars/electrically 
powered cars (city of tomorrow) 
2002 New regulation on car distribu-
tion (block exemption) 
• Increase inter-brand competition in 
Europe 
• Level out price differences between 
European countries, increased com-
petition in car distribution 
 
In 1995, the Commission had installed a taskforce for the “car of tomorrow”. A 
specific concern of the Commission was to foster inter-European research co-
operation. In a resolution from 1997, the European Parliament urged the Com-
mission to extend the role of this task force to a strategic function dealing with 
problems of industry competitiveness as well as with environmental and safety 
issues. The Parliament stressed that the Commission should pay more attention 
to social aspects, particularly the need for an increase in vocational training, 
more information and consultation of employees as well as protection against 
mass dismissals (EU Bulletin 3-1997). The European Council for Automotive 
R&D (EUCAR), an industry consortium, representing the research and devel-
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opment organisations of automotive manufacturers in Europe was established 
as part of ACEA in 1994. Two years earlier, in 1992, USCAR had been formed 
for pre-competitive research collaboration between the Big Three in the USA. 
While USCAR and the related partnership for a new generation of vehicles 
(PNGV, an industry-government research and development alliance established 
in 1993, succeeded by FreedomCAR in 2002) clearly focussed on new product 
technologies, EUCAR recently developed a broader approach.5 Thus, in view of 
the sixth EU R&D framework programme EUCAR recently came out with a pro-
posal on “road transport research” focussing on the three dimensions of envi-
ronment, energy resources; safety for road users; and mobility and transport.6 
Summarising on the point of the existence of a European automobile policy, 
we follow McLaughlin and Maloney (1999: 202) in their conclusion on European 
automobile industry governance: “We would argue strongly that the EU does 
have an industrial policy for automobiles. Its central pillars are the state aid 
framework, technical harmonisation and the removal of tariff barriers to the EU 
markets.” However, the authors also stress that the EU policies “have promoted 
internationalisation rather than Europeanization. The Commission has at-
tempted to expose European national champions to greater global competition.” 
(ibid.) 
Thus, the EU policy mostly had a neo-liberal agenda: reducing state subsi-
dies and opening up the European markets. This was accompanied by the sup-
port of R&D projects of the industry and measures regarding social and labour 
aspects. Those who advocated a more active industry policy, however, re-
mained critical of this policy:  
“ACEA has, on several occasions, urged the Commission to pursue a ‘managed 
trade’ strategy and to learn the lessons of the Japanese Ministry of international 
trade’s success with industrial policy initiatives. Those academic commentators who 
are highly critical of the Commission’s laissez-faire approach to industrial policy 
have been equally scathing. Williams et al. (1994: 184) argue that the volet interne 
for automobiles amounts to little more than ‘few high-tech projects and some noises 
about training’. This is not far from the reality of the situation. There is, of course, a 
difference between the strategy that is deliberately minimalist and not having a 
strategy at all.” (McLaughlin/Maloney 1999: 202) 
In any case, there does not exist a dedicated “automobile pot” (ibid.: 194) of 
money to support the industry. The sector policy orientation has been de-
emphasized by the EU in recent years.7 The automotive industry, however, has 
                                            
5 A comparative review of pre-competitive innovation activities in the USA, Europe 
and Japan in the case of research on batteries for electric cars and hybrid cars is 
presented by Larrue (2002). 
6 The General Report on the Activities of the European Union  1997: “the Commis-
sion, for its part, proposed a key action on the city of tomorrow aimed at develop-
ing the technologies needed to produce and use fuel-efficient, clean, safe and in-
telligent vehicles in urban areas” (European Commission 1997a). 
7 Thus, the ninth survey on state aid in the European Union stated in 2001: “There 
are no aid schemes in the EU that are specific to the sub-sector of the motor vehi-
cle industry. State aid is approved to the sector mainly by way of regional rescue 
and restructuring and training aid” (European Commission 2001: 40). 
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always been a major “customer” of the various general support programmes of 
the EU in the areas of training (FORCE, LEONARDO etc.) and the various 
framework programmes for research and technological development (RTD) 
from 1984 onwards.  
In assessing the impact of the EU level policies, it is important also to take 
into account the aspects related to the “social dimension” of the EU and meas-
ures in the area of labour and industrial relations. 
The European works councils (EWC) are considered the most striking ex-
ample8 of a policy orientation seeking to balance interests between capital and 
labour and between plants in different regions of the EU. EWC “help to foster 
exchanges of views and discussions which are essential for the development of 
multinational understanding of industrial relations. In years to come, these Euro 
work councils could provide the proper forum for addressing issues such as 
mobility, transferability of rights and equal opportunities” (European Commis-
sion 2000b: 6). The EWC constitute a supplementary institution for the repre-
sentation of the workers interest. They do not replace already existing elected 
bodies in the member states. Their competencies remain rather low, they are 
limited to information and consultation, and only in recent agreements (signed 
after 1997) has the need for a timely provision of information and consultation 
been stipulated in the texts.9  
More than 1,200 companies operating in Europe (15 million employees) are 
covered by the legislation. About 500 companies had reached EWC agree-
ments by early 1999. By the early 1990s, most of them were concluded on a 
voluntary basis. Voluntary EWC agreements – with less binding obligations – 
remain in force, even if they do not fully meet the conditions set by the Euro-
pean Directive.  
Extending the idea of a Europe-wide works council system, a few compa-
nies, e.g. the Volkswagen AG, have established world works councils on a vol-
untary basis. Carrying this development a step forward a first global code of 
conduct (Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships at Volks-
wagen, of June 2002) was signed between Volkswagen, the new VW world 
works council and the International Metal Workers’ Federation (IMF). The VW-
IMF code is largely based on ILO core labour standards. 
                                            
8 Already in the early 1970s labour law directives made it compulsory to inform and 
consult employees about major economic upheavals. In 1994 a council Directive 
made it obligatory to inform and to consult employees within European groups 
employing more than 1000 people.  
9 This was due to the conflict about the closure of the Renault plant in Villevorde 
(Belgium). The EWC of Renault was informed after the decision had been made 
and was consulted on the consequences of the decision only. cf. the detailed 
analysis of negotiations on the introduction of EWC, undertaken by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2000: 5).  
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The social dialogue at the supranational European level is the counterpart of the 
EWC. A voluntary bipartite dialogue process10 is currently being developed in 
24 sectors. The aim of the initial dialogue is to identify relevant problem areas 
for the social dialogue and to develop a common “vocabulary”. This explains 
why, at the present stage, commitments resulting from the sectoral social dia-
logue are still thin on the ground.  
The bipartite dialogue between the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Con-
federations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) also called “Val Duchesse” social dialogue was adopted in 1985 by the 
UNICE, CEEP (Centre Europeén des Entreprises a Participation Publique) and 
the ETUC. The role of the social partners was later recognized in the Treaty of 
Maastricht (Articles 138 and 139). The social partners can explore and discuss 
key issues (economic policies, completion of the Internal Market, implementa-
tion of the Social Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers). In 1991, the 
agreement between the social partners served as a basis for drawing up the 
new treaty articles stipulating the role of the social partners at the European 
level. The new provisions came into force in 1993. “The social partners’ right to 
be consulted on proposals in the social field and to opt for agreement-based 
rather than legislative measures now makes them central players in the Euro-
pean social arena. The ‘joint opinions’ period has thus gradually given way to 
the negotiation of European framework agreements11” (European Commission 
2000b: 8).  
In 1997, the European Council (Job Summit in Luxembourg) established a 
study group to analyze industrial changes in the European Union. In its final 
report, the group concludes that industrial restructuring will be an increasingly 
important topic for social dialogue in each sector. The social dialogue has to be 
developed as an “in-house social dialogue”, based on information and consulta-
tion of the workers representatives. “The systemic development of social dia-
logue within companies, nationally and at the European Union level is funda-
mental for managing change and preventing negative social consequences and 
deterioration of the social fabric. Social dialogue ensures a balance is main-
tained between corporate flexibility and workers’ safety.” (European Commis-
sion 1998: 9) 
A trend towards common policies, however, should not be confused with a 
trend towards the establishment of a common system of industrial relations. The 
EU-Report on industrial relations states very clearly: “Practices governing the 
framework of dialogue, the outcome of collective bargaining, the conditions for 
collective action and the arrangements for resolving conflicts are, however, still 
determined at national level. European law is not applicable to such matters, 
                                            
10 The cross-industry social dialogue is based on the idea of tripartite concertation. 
Tripartite concertation was already strengthened in the 1970s (Standing Commit-
tee on Employment). 
11 Three agreements have been signed since 1995: parental leave (December 
1995), part-time employment (June 1997) and fixed term employment contracts 
(March 1999).  
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which are underpinned by strong national traditions.” (European Commission 
2000b: 9) 
The goal of preventing negative social consequences of industrial change 
can also be clearly seen in the statements of the Commission concerning the 
organisation of work. The support of human oriented work systems has been an 
important element of all RTD framework programmes. Thus, the FAST-
Research Program (FAST stands for “Forecasting and Assessment in Science 
and Technology”), set up by the European Commission in 1992, promoted the 
idea of an “anthropocentric production system”. It is considered as an advanced 
manufacturing system, which depends on the balanced integration of human 
skills, collaborative work organization, and adapted technologies (FAST-Monitor 
1992). 
On the development of production systems, the year 2000 Report on Gov-
ernment Support Programmes for New Forms of Work Organisation states: 
“Major changes are taking place in the way in which work is organized within 
companies. They are based on the new model of ‘high trust’,12 ‘high skill’, and 
extensive employee involvement in decision making.” Recent changes in the 
regulations governing the European Social Fund give member states an oppor-
tunity to use funds in new ways, including the provision of support for the intro-
duction of new forms of work (European Commission 2000c: 2). 
Designing the next steps, the Report on Government Support Programmes 
recommends that the programs should foster the introduction of holistic “high 
performance work systems” and the introduction of new performance meas-
urement and reward systems (European Commission 2000c: 5). According to 
this report, high-performance work organization encompasses new organiza-
tional structures (market and process orientated business units and semi-
autonomous work teams); more flexible and less hierarchical working methods 
(flexible working hours, multi-skilling and job rotation); new business practices 
(quality management, continuous improvement), new corporate cultures (high-
trust relations, increased participation, greater personal autonomy and account-
ability); increased investment in education and training; new performance 
measurement techniques and new reward systems (performance orientation, 
bonuses, profit sharing).  
In a very optimistic interpretation, the report on New Forms of Work Organi-
zation concludes: “New Forms of Work Organisation have created a new para-
digm. Based on unlocking the creativity and commitment of workers through an 
environment of ‘high trust’ and ‘high skill’, high-performance work practices pro-
vide workers with opportunities to control their work, to develop wider skills, and 
to take responsibility for a wide range of tasks. There are, however, concerns 
that such practices might increase stress and erode traditional skills. There are 
                                            
12 The importance of the high trust relationship and education can be found in nearly 
all European reports on modernization and industrial relations systems. The Man-
aging Change Report (European Commission 1998: 5) argues that companies 
“should realize that investment in people is profitable and that trust between em-
ployees and employers is a prerequisite for success.” 
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also uncertainties about the impact new forms of work organization may have 
on traditional relationships between unions, workers, and managers.” (Euro-
pean Commission 2000c: 13). 
With reference to the Green Paper “Partnership for a New Organization of 
Work” (European Commission 1996) the main tendencies supported by the 
European Union can be summarized as follows. 
– Europe needs to foster high skills and promote high quality in the workplace 
in order to improve productivity and create the conditions for employment 
and productivity. 
– Europe needs to introduce new forms of work organization in all sectors. 
– Europe needs to speed up the process of modernizing work organization. 
– Europe needs to pay more attention to the gender perspective, including 
the reconciliation of working and family life. 
Summarizing, we can indeed observe a distinct European concern to align in-
dustrial policy aiming to increase competitiveness and foster ecological goals 
with elements of a social policy, aiming to increase social cohesion, social dia-
logue, and a human oriented system of work with worker participation, a high 
emphasis on skills and trust relationship. There is nothing equivalent to this ap-
proach in the other two regions of the triad. One may argue that this social ele-
ment of the equation is too weak and mostly symbolical. It certainly has not pre-
vented “unsocial” measures such as relocation of plants following cost differ-
ences within the EU, as Castillo and López Calle have shown in their case study 
on component suppliers to Volkswagen-Navarra (Castillo / López Calle 2002). 
In addition, the reality in many cases is different from EC discourse and the 
high-flying goals proclaimed in various documents. One has to note, however, 
that there has been no comparable move towards the “low road” development 
model (seeking advantages of low cost production sites, as in the case of USA 
– Mexico (cf. Cooke et al. 2001) in Europe so far.13 The European Works coun-
cil provides a platform to co-ordinate interests and prevents whipsawing be-
tween plants within the transnational production system of companies. In this 
sense, a recent report on industrial relations and change states: “Industrial rela-
tions can make an important contribution to good governance and push forward 
the European strategy, fostering modernization based on a new social contract, 
exploring new ways to strengthen competitiveness with social cohesion, creat-
ing better prospects for employment and improving living and working condi-
tions”. (European Commission 2002b) 
                                            
13 However, the enlargement of the European Union will include a number of coun-
tries with wage levels around of € 300 per month, as opposed to more than € 2000 
in many of the current EU Member states. According to the IUF, the gross social 
product of the ten accession countries taken together represents no more than 
that of the Netherlands. The great gap in social and economic development in 
Europe is considered a threat (www.inf.org/iuf/CEE/03.htm). 
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3. Market Characteristics 
Customer preferences and market structures differ widely between the Euro-
pean countries and regions. This can be explained by differences of taste, cul-
ture, social and geographic characteristics as well as by different socio-
economic conditions. (cf. Williams 2002, 13). The EU goal of achieving socio-
economic harmonization between the European countries is still far from being 
realized even if we leave out the situation of the new entrants from Middle and 
Eastern Europe. The average purchasing power (table 1), indicates that there 
are deep socio-economic disparities in particular between the Northern and the 
Southern European countries. 
Table 1: Average Standard Purchasing Power (equivalent net income 
p. a.) in the EU 15 countries 1996 
EU-15 B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A P FIN S UK 
12,31
6 
13,85
7 
14,04
3 
14,05
2 
8,400 9,102 13,49
6 
10,94
9 
10,10
1 
21,99
2 
13,41
4 
14,37
7 
7,722 - - 13,721 
Source: eurostat/European Commission (2001, Anhang II, p. 120) 
Europe (EU member states and the Central and Eastern European Candidates) 
can be considered as a “semi-integrated market” if one takes into account the 
following dimensions (cf. Lung 2002: 2): 
– Products (vehicles, product range, and components) are quite homoge-
nous: small cars and lower middle range cars represent in the European 
average 60% of the EU-market.  
– The institutional supervisory framework throughout the EU-market is har-
monized and coordinated by the European Commission (technical and en-
vironmental norms, distribution regulations, competition policy).  
Intra-European heterogeneities are very small when compared with the differ-
ences between the European market and the world’s two other major industrial-
ized markets.  
In view of the question of European distinctiveness, three particularities 
shall be addressed in the following: The high degree of brand loyalty in Europe 
(at least when compared to North America), the sports car and racing car tradi-
tion, and the importance of the Diesel market. 
(1) A fundamental difference between the North American and EU market 
in terms of customers is the number of cars per household. The average Ameri-
can new-car buyer is actually a “fleet manager”, adding and subtracting cars 
from the roughly 2.5 vehicles per household. In Europe one is much more likely 
to own the one car. It seems plausible that brand loyalty is greater when one is 
replacing the one vehicle every five years or so, versus the American model of 
updating a unit within the fleet every two years or so. At least one is more emo-
tionally invested and thus less price-sensitive if one just has the one vehicle. 
- 11 - 
A further evidence of brand loyalty is given by the fact that the Japanese share 
is highest in countries with no local auto industry to which consumers have de-
veloped loyalty, i.e. Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, etc.14 
It is not clear to what extent changes in the distribution system (block ex-
emption15) will affect these factors. In any case, there seem to be marketing 
barriers to Japan and North America, which have helped the EU to resurge. 
(2) Sports and racing cars together with luxury cars have always been a 
European field of specialisation. While the enthusiasm for these cars is not 
Europe-specific, Europe has remained the lead market for performance-
oriented customers meaning that technological improvements in the upper 
ranges diffuses more quickly into the other car categories. Europe also re-
mained the world centre in the design and assembly of sports cars (cf. Pinch et 
al. 1997; Henry and Pinch 2000). We shall return to this issue later. 
Table 2: Share of Car and Engine Types of Total Market 
 Light Trucks Diesel Mini car 
NA 50% < 1% < 1% 
EU incl. 
EFTA 
10% 43% 7%* 
Japan 15** 16% 30%*** 
*  Newly registered passenger cars below 999 cc on the German market 2000; cf. 
Lung 2002: EU Market: Small car B ca. 27%! 
**  Own estimate 
*** Below 660 cc 
Based on ACEA 2002. New Passenger Car & Light Commercial vehicle (<5 t), Break-
down by specifications in: www.acea.be; VDA 2001, Tatsachen und Zahlen, 65. Folge, 
164; JAMA (2001): The Motor Industry of Japan, in: www.jama.or.jp/14_english/index. 
html. 
(3) Regulation has helped to shape and deepen consumer preferences, and this 
is true for all three triad markets. In the course of the 1990s, there has been a 
clear tendency of divergence between the three main world regional markets. In 
                                            
14 Three different country types have to be distinguished in Europe: Countries with 
own brands, countries without own brands, but with car or parts manufacturing and 
countries without brands and car-related manufacturing. The three types corre-
spond with very different strategies of marketing and pricing.  
15 Buzzavo/Volpato (2001) and Stochetti/Volpato (2001) provide data on the evolu-
tion of the car distribution system in Europe, the U.S. and Japan and underpin the 
consequences of the shift from sellers markets towards buyers markets on the 
whole value chain. (cf. Volpato/Stochetti 2002). Buzzavo/Volpato (2001: 10) sum-
marize the key principles of the European, U.S. and Japanese distribution sys-
tems. One key peculiar aspect of the European systems is described as follows: 
“European manufacturers can oblige dealers to refuse sales to unauthorized resel-
lers.” The Commission in the meantime has revised the regulation on bloc exemp-
tions aiming at the improvement of inter-brand competition.  
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Japan, it is the rise of the mini cars (cars below 660 cc) which have doubled 
their market share from below 16% in 1990 to over 30%; cars of below 2,000 cc 
made up 82% of the Japanese market in 2000. 
In North America, it is the story of light trucks, which make up about 50% of 
the total market today from around 30% in 1990. 
In Europe, it is the Diesel story. The share of Diesel-engine cars increased 
from 19% to 42% between 1990 and 2001 while in Japan, and in the USA, it is 
virtual nil. 
Thus, the differences between the triad markets have deepened in the 
course of the 1990s and the trend of divergence seems to continue. 
Summarizing: Market structures, in particular since recently the “carving 
out” of the European market segment of Diesel-powered cars has contributed to 
the European resurgence considerably. Government regulation and the co-
ordination of competencies and knowledge via research support programmes 
have played a crucial role as the Diesel experience has shown (cf. Diesel Tech-
nology Forum 2001). 
- 13 - 
4. The Quest for an Alternative “European” Production 
System 
This is an area where European agents have made numerous attempts towards 
developing a European approach (cf. Jürgens 1997). Since the days of George 
Friedman, the critique of Taylorism was the common denominator. The Tavis-
tock Institute, the socio-technical systems approach, the industrial democracy 
and humanisation of work programmes carried out in various combinations of 
partnerships between employers, trade unions and the state could be listed 
here. Beginning with the New Factories Movement (Agurén/Edgren 1980) in 
Sweden, alternative forms of production organisation were implemented in the 
car industry since the 1970s, in particular the 1980s. The various approaches 
and their development have been described in detail in the literature. 
In the following, a closer look at the specific approach developed in Swe-
den, which clearly played an avant-garde role in this field, shall be taken: The 
“Swedish Revolution” (Agureén /Edgren 1980: 7) was mostly driven by labour 
market concerns. High absenteeism, labour turnover, and difficulties in recruit-
ing new workers became the driving forces for the development of an alterna-
tive work organization to make industrial work more attractive (Sandberg, 1995: 
89). Volvo became the forerunner in a process of an organizational develop-
ment focusing on the use of “human resources”, leading to the most advanced 
forms of departure from the Fordist-Taylorist paradigm. 
The Volvo experiences prove that significant work reforms require a specific 
process layout based on an assembly-oriented product structure (cf. Engström/ 
Medbo 2001). The central elements of the Uddevalla system combine a differ-
ent production layout with a specific type of teamwork16. The resulting patterns 
of the production system are based on four central principles: 
(1) stationary assembly – work is no longer paced by the assembly line (time 
sovereignty); 
(2) holistic work cycles for the group (complete assembly of a car), based on a 
coherent connection of single tasks; 
(3) long individual work cycles (goal: two hours after the completion of training); 
(4) a “representative workforce” with a composition reflecting age and gender 
of the general working population.17 
                                            
16 Crucial for understanding the Uddevalla production system – called “reflective pro-
duction system” by its academic support team (Ellegård 1996) – was a synthesis 
of learning theory and material handling which was essential to achieve the long-
cycle time assembly work. This concept emerged from experiments of disassem-
bling components, which were then reconfigured under criteria of ease of assem-
bly and ease of memorizing (cognitive mapping) by the assembly workers. On this 
basis a “kitting” method was developed which turned the actual placement of ma-
terials on the transport racks into assembling guidelines.  
17 Thus the aim was to have around 25% of employees below the age of 25, 50% 
between 25 and 45 years and 25% older than 45 years; the goal also was to have 
around 40% female employees. In practice these goals were only partially real-
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Against all odds, long-cycle work was mastered by the workforce up to the lev-
els set by the planners (minimum two hours) and many workers aimed at 
achieving the “complete car builder” certificate (Engström et al. 1996). 
The Swedish work reforms triggered a wide debate in European countries. 
They constituted a reference for national experiments in many companies. 
However, European carmakers were not inclined to adopt the “Volvo Model” as 
a whole. Comparing the small production output of Volvo with the production 
volume of Fiat, Renault, and Volkswagen, the management of “mass producers” 
reached the conclusion that the “Volvo-Model” does not constitute a viable al-
ternative to the assembly line and its competitive advantages based on large-
series production. German companies operating in the premium price segment 
(Mercedes, BMW) took a slightly different position.  
However, in view of the broadening protest movement against working 
conditions in mass production and, in some European countries, due to state 
support – such as the German “Humanization of Work” (HdA) programme18 (cf. 
Badham/Naschold 1994) or the activities of ANACT (Agence nationale pour 
l’amélioration des conditions de travail) in France – many companies began to 
adopt at least some elements of the Swedish work concepts. This led to various 
experiments with new forms of work – long work cycles, decoupling from the 
pressure of the assembly line, enrichment of jobs, team work etc. – in the 
1980s. 
However, the “Swedish turn” of the production system debate was of short 
duration. At the beginning of the 1990s, a shift into different directions took 
place. The Swedish-oriented alternative required far-reaching changes in the 
technical production structures, in particular a shift from the assembly line to a 
stationary assembly. A completely new process layout like at Uddevalla was not 
adopted by any of the European carmakers however. Nevertheless, even the 
more modest versions of a Swedish-oriented approach such as stationary as-
sembly of certain modules or the hybrid process layout of the Mercedes-Benz 
plant at Rastatt did not survive the U-turn. Pilot experiences were soon scaled 
back or scrapped altogether. Figure 2 shows this rollback and the return to 
                                                                                                                                
ized. In 1993 28% of assembly workers were women; 54% were under 32 years 
old. 
18 The majority of projects supported by the HDA Program was on measures to im-
prove work-related strain and stress, ergonomic issues such as overhead work, 
heavy lifting etc. Greifenstein/Kißler (1994: 15) state that from 1974 to 1994 only 
33 research projects of the Program dealt with “group work”. 10 of them took place 
in the car industry. In spite of the low number, these experiments have had a high 
impact on the discussion. The most advanced experiments were concerned with 
subassembly areas (doors, instrument panel, wiring harness system etc.). Usually 
the modules taken off the mainline would encompass those operations where the 
model mix had caused most problems in terms of differing labour content and line 
balancing. However, essential Uddevalla innovations were not implemented. Nei-
ther was the assembly line abolished altogether, nor were work organization and 
qualification systems introduced aiming at small work groups building complete 
cars (Jürgens 1995: 208). 
- 15 - 
more conventional solutions. The refurbishment of the Rastatt plant of Mer-
cedes-Benz is a very good example of this trend (Jürgens 1997). 
Figure 2: Toward A European Model of Work Organization: From 
Taylorism to Uddevalla (and Retour) 
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As a résumé of the European activities, it must be concluded that EU policy has 
had little impact on production systems and industrial relations systems in 
Europe so far. One driving force for work reforms in the late 60s and the 70s – 
tight labour markets and thus the need to make industrial work more attractive 
for workers – did not exist any longer. In contrast, in Japan, the labour shortage 
led to a disdain there for ‘dirty’ industry jobs. Nissan and Toyota responded by 
developing a “people-friendly” plant design for their new plants in Kyushu in the 
early 1990s (cf. Shimizu 1999). This driving force has disappeared in Europe as 
well as in Japan in the meantime. Demographic development indicates a lack of 
young workers and a dramatically ageing workforce for the future. Nevertheless, 
since the 1990s, the lean production/Toyota production system clearly has be-
come, or remained, the dominating paradigm, in terms of philosophy if not prac-
tice. 
However, a strong orientation towards concepts of “good work” or “decent 
work” which had been developed in the course of the debate about new forms 
of work is still ‘alive and kicking’, in particular within the labour unions in some 
countries. A recent example is the concept of “The rewarding work organisa-
tion”© (ReWO©) which was developed as an evaluation tool for work planning for 
the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (cf. Bergström 2000). The term “decent 
work” has been introduced by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to 
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address policy concerns over rights at work, employment opportunities and 
working conditions in the context of the new policy framework (Egger 2002). 
Another example is the 5000x5000 project now being realised at the Volks-
wagen Wolfsburg site. The agreement struck between Volkswagen and the IG 
Metall on August 28, 2001, contains regulations on work design. Under “Goals”, 
it is emphasized that: 
“Each employee has the right of a human-oriented work design. (…) Work organisa-
tion has to be designed in such a way that employees will neither be over- or under-
taxed, that they will be charged with diversified and holistic tasks which correspond 
with and which require further development of their knowledge and abilities.” 
(Translation U. J.) 
                                           
It remains to be seen how these goals will be implemented in practice. The 
greatest impact of the alternative design movement probably was in the area of 
small and medium sized companies which to a large extent have introduced 
cellular production concepts in their manufacturing and assembly areas. Cellu-
lar layout and teamwork have become widespread and seem to be non-
controversial in practice there.  
Overall, it must be said that the general impact of the alternative work de-
sign movement on operations management in European plants remained lim-
ited.19In an unplanned way, however, a link exists between the “new production 
concepts” and modularisation. And as “modularisation” is a strong candidate for 
European distinctiveness in the present discussion, these concepts are very 
pertinent to our topic. 
Modularisation concepts came up in the late 1970s/early 80s. They were a 
European particularity at first, even though the basic idea was developed much 
earlier in other industry contexts (cf. Starr 1965). In the late 1970s, early 1980s, 
almost every European carmaker experimented with some kind of alternative to 
the assembly line by installing “modular areas” off the main line, called produc-
tion cells, assembly islands etc. These modularisation approaches were produc-
tion-oriented, and driven by increasing product complexities or by automation 
projects. While some companies developed modular areas mostly in assembly 
plants by setting up stationary production areas (“islands”) for the assembly of 
doors, cockpits, seats etc. aiming at the improvement of working conditions 
(longer cycle times, job enrichment), other companies were more interested in 
designing a process which allowed a maximum degree of automation. A promi-
nent example for the latter was Volkswagen’s assembly plant in Wolfsburg es-
tablished for the production of its high-volume product, the Golf in the early 
1980s. The new process layout required a new product architecture. Conse-
quently, a new design for the front end of the car was developed and along with 
this a concept of the front end module. This module was built on a subassembly 
line at the Wolfsburg plant at that time. A decade later, the “front end” was one 
of the first modules to be assembled (while still developed by VW) by a supplier 
firm (Hella) at VW’s new assembly plant in Mosel, East Germany. 
 
19 Indicators do point towards convergent technical production systems operating 
with divergent social systems (with its implications on: work organization, wage/in-
come; cf. Clarke/Gijsel/Janssen 2000). 
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The assembly islands for stationary production of cockpits, doors etc. es-
tablished by many carmakers in the 1980s have all been scrapped in the mean-
time. However, the carmakers did not integrate these operations into their as-
sembly operations again. After having been defined as separate modules, they 
became a major business for suppliers in the 1990s. 
This leads us to supplier relations as an important area of European dis-
tinctiveness. 
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5. Europe’s Supplier Structure and the Direction of Its 
Restructuring 
The restructuring of the 1990s made the European supplier landscape a par-
ticular hot spot. This for two reasons: Firstly, many of the existing companies 
were too small in terms of new product development capacity, global plant cov-
erage, and access to capital markets. Requirements of OEMs regarding modu-
larisation and globalisation could not be met under these conditions. Secondly, 
with the Big Three US companies, as well as PSA and Fiat in Europe, spinning 
off their internal supplier base, these companies aggressively acquired Euro-
pean firms to gain access to OEMs and to specific technologies. Other Ameri-
can companies, most of them publicly listed, followed taking advantage of the 
favourable stock-market conditions in the USA.  
Therefore, the traditional structure had come under strong pressures for 
change – a situation that required and allowed new solutions (on the driving 
forces and directions of the restructuring of OEM-supplier relationships cf. Vol-
pato 2002). To what extent has this led to a distinctive European approach? 
The following three developments are of specific interest in this regard: Firstly, 
modularisation and systems-supply capabilities; secondly, supplier parks and 
OEM/supplier plant consortiums, and thirdly the formation of regional networks 
(“clusters”) of SME.  
5.1 Strategies towards Modularisation 
In the meantime, the production of modules such as cockpits, doors etc. at the 
OEM plants mentioned above has become a major business for suppliers. Fa-
cilitating this transition was one of the major functions of the crisis of the early 
1990s. The division of the supplier industry into tiers – the reduction in the num-
ber of direct OEM suppliers following the Japanese example – received a par-
ticular thrust under these conditions: The suppliers of systems and modules 
would be the natural candidates for first-tier suppliers receiving sub-modules 
and components from the second-tier suppliers and they in turn buy their parts 
from third-tier suppliers and so on. Defining the modules20 in view of the various 
requirements (cf. Takeishi/Fujimoto 2001), and aligning the different needs and 
viewpoints of design, manufacturing, logistics and after-sales services21 re-
quired an enormous engineering effort on the side of the OEMs, and on the side 
of the suppliers which wanted this business. In addition, enormous efforts were 
necessary to acquire the engineering capabilities.  
                                            
20 The term “module” is not clearly defined and therefore used by suppliers in a loose 
sense. There is no unique definition for modules, systems, core competencies and 
strategic competencies (cf. Toyota definitions page 4 in Chanaron 2001). 
21 For this reason, Sako and Fixson stress the need for compromise between the 
different actors involved: “… ‘Modularity’ really encompasses a bundle of product 
characteristics and different constituencies place different weights on them” 
(Sako/Fixson 2001: 8). 
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European carmakers were the first to make these efforts and urge suppliers to 
join them in developing the modular concepts. They found American suppliers 
and particular the spin offs of the Big Three to be very eager to pursue this new 
business strategy. The Big Three adopted the modular approach early on in 
their planning for new factories in South America. For their North American op-
eration, however, it took longer to implement them. The Japanese carmakers 
have been much more reluctant in adopting modular concepts (cf. Takeishi/Fu-
jimoto 2001; Ikeda/Nakagawa 2002). 
Thus, the structural change in the automotive supply has been greatest in 
Europe. According to a study of a German consultant group, modules and sys-
tems made up 22% of the total automotive supply for European carmakers in 
1993; components made up 57%; standard parts 13% and raw materials 8%. 
Until 2000, the forecast expects the share of modules and systems to increase 
up to 43%; the share of components to decrease to 42%; the share of standard 
parts are expected to make up 8% and the share of raw materials 7% of the 
total supply value (Wolters 1995). 
The trend toward modules and systems provides strong support to the 
trend towards “mega-suppliers”. Only a small number of players worldwide can 
provide the capabilities required. According to the German consulting group 
Roland Berger, consolidation in the industry had led to oligopolies of seven to 
eight top suppliers per module and system in 2000 already. For 2005, the con-
sultants forecast a reduction of this number per module and system to five to 
six, and for 2010 to three to five. At the same time, the number of modules and 
systems per vehicle decline with a further integration of parts and functions into 
larger modules resp. systems. While there were 18 to 20 modules and systems 
per vehicle in 2000, Roland Berger forecasts a reduction to 14 to 16 by 2005 
and to around ten by 2010 (Roland Berger & Berger 1997). 
In an international comparative perspective, two different strategies of 
modularization can be discerned (cf. Chanaron 2001):  
The Japanese OEMs, in particular Toyota and Honda, prefer functional 
modules and emphasize the optimization of total vehicle design. Outsourcing is 
only one of the available methods to reach such goals. Both companies do not 
see the benefits of charging their suppliers with larger responsibilities in the 
sense of the modularization approach. They rather seek to retain basic compe-
tencies in all strategic areas and the control over the value chain. Some of the 
Western companies also tried to retain comprehensive competences in all stra-
tegic areas resp. gain competences in new technology areas such as electron-
ics. (cf. figure 3)  
This contrasts with other European and American OEMs which – aiming to 
focus on core competencies – have increased the responsibilities of first tier 
suppliers even if this meant the loss of competencies in these areas. They also 
require suppliers to take the responsibility for new product development as well 
as for purchasing and organising the supply chains of their products. 
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Figure 3: Two strategic alternatives 
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Source: Based on Chanaron (2001: 3) with modifications by U. J. 
The European and American OEMs put their priority on requirements related to 
assembly operations and global coherence for their multi-plant operations. They 
stress cost reduction through externalization of tasks to suppliers and through 
focusing their own resource allocation on a limited number of core competen-
cies. Suppliers should have R&D and innovation capabilities: “therefore, they 
are large and global corporations.” (Chanaron 2001: 14)  
Takeishi and Fujimoto summarize their analysis of the differences between 
Western and Japanese approaches as follows: “Western automakers have a 
strong inclination toward ‘modularization in inter-firm system,’ or outsourcing, 
which has stimulated ‘modularization in production.’ One of their challenges is 
to cope with the inconsistency or conflict created between such ‘modularization 
in procurement/production’ and ‘modularization in product architecture.’ Japa-
nese automakers, on the contrary, have focused on in-house ‘modularization in 
production’ thus far and have been relatively quiet about aggressive outsourcing 
adopted by Western counterparts. Automakers in Japan instead seem to seek 
for ‘modularization in product architecture’ facilitated by the need for the func-
tionality and conformance quality of modules assembled on in-house subas-
sembly lines.” (Takeshi/Fujimoto 2001: 5) 
5.2 The Trend towards Specialisation 
The trend towards modularisation is going along with a trend towards increasing  
specialisation and this affects the way the value chain is coordinated and con-
trolled. While in the past the OEMs tried to control more or less all steps of the 
process chain of its suppliers, each of the new specialised groups develops its 
own area of responsibility now. It is possible to distinguish between four differ-
ent groups of specialists: firstly, the group of companies specialising on compo-
nents that require high technology expertise (e.g. KS, Mahle, GKN and Meritor). 
The second group specialises on systems and modules (examples are Visteon, 
Lear, Johnson Controls, and Bosch). The third group specialises on product 
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development tasks such as computer-aided design, prototyping, testing etc. 
(e.g. firms like EDAG Engineering, AVL, Bertrandt and Rücker). The fourth 
group aims at becoming assembly specialists (e.g. Karmann, Bertone, Matra, 
Pininfarina, Magna, Valmet, etc.). Most companies of this group have engineer-
ing capacity to develop whole cars stopping short of the point of becoming 
brand name companies themselves. The fifth group would be the former OEMs, 
which become the brand integrators focusing on product planning and market-
ing. Because of this tendency of specialisation, the image of “networks” seems 
more appropriate than the image of the OEM-dominated “pyramid” to describe 
the new configuration of actors. In any case, OEMs will be increasingly unable 
to control the relations in a (quasi-)hierarchical manner. Thus, they lack the 
competences to specify and control the work of suppliers in the same way as 
they did in the traditional system. Figure 4 shows the transition from the spe-
cialisation pattern, which was still prevalent in the late 1990s to the specialisa-
tion pattern described above. The author also gives some estimates about the 
shifts of weights between the different actor groups in terms of their share of the 
total value. 
Figure 4: Shifting weights due to the segmentation of the value chains 
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Source: Küspert (2000) 
The emergence of new forms of specialisation deeply affects structures and 
strategies of all actors in the automotive sector. Deverticalisation of the OEMs 
and the division into tiers of the supply industry means that suppliers have to 
cope with an increased volume and scope of work. At the same time, they have 
to find their places in a changed configuration of actors. Most suppliers longer 
have direct contact to the OEMs and, therefore, lose the personal and social 
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contacts that in the past often had been the source of learning about new busi-
ness opportunities and future directions discussed at the OEMs. At the same 
time, new technical concepts like modularisation require new capabilities to in-
tegrate different technologies and new capabilities to cooperate within supplier 
networks and with the OEMs. This development leads to three types of chal-
lenges of co-operation across company borders, which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
5.3 Niches and Specialists Related to the Sports Car/Racing 
Tradition 
This is another important area of European distinctiveness (cf. Chanaron 2002) 
Since the early years of the history of the automobile, Europe has been the cen-
tre of niche luxury cars/sports cars/racing cars. While some of the renowned 
companies in this field have been taken over by bigger players, many have re-
mained independent. These firms are in most cases embedded in a network of 
production, engineering, and other support firms. The formula one complex in 
the UK may serve as an example here. “Motor Sport Valley”, as the complex is 
called by Henry and Pinch (2000), dominates the world production of racing 
cars. The industry employs more than 30,000 people and consists of around 
200 small and medium-sized firms clustered around Oxfordshire in Southern 
England. Approximately three quarters of the world’s racing cars are designed 
and assembled in this region including the vast majority of the most competitive 
formula 1 cars (Henry/Pinch 2000: 192; see also Pinch et al. 1997). While the 
UK may have lost its role as mass production location for cars, it remains to be 
the centre for the formula one complex. The number of employees employed by 
a great number of small specialist firms around this complex altogether is equal 
to a fully-grown car manufacturer. A similar though smaller network can be 
found around Bologna in Italy (cf. Bardi/Garibaldo 2001). 
The industry structure of specialised small and medium companies support-
ing the sports car and racing complex – engineering service firms as well as 
firms for prototyping and manufacturing – became a valuable asset for car 
manufacturers seeking to differentiate their product range and create attractive 
niche cars in the 1990s. In this way, Europe had fewer problems with “look 
alike” cars than General Motors. For instance when differentiating models of its 
various brands in North America. 
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6. Challenges for Cross-company and Inter-organisational 
Cooperation 
6.1 Cooperation at the Point of Assembly 
Related to the goal of modularisation but also to the goal of reducing the 
amount of capital investment, new concepts for integrated production sites have 
been developed during the 1990s. The “Europeanness” of this approach has to 
be relativized. First, in view of the fact that the American Big Three also pursued 
this approach in planning their new factories in South America. Second, in view 
of the fact that Nissan’s European assembly plant in Sunderland had played an 
important pioneering role in developing supplier integrated production sites. In 
North America resp. Japan the car manufacturers proceeded much slower and 
failed in their efforts to implement similar programmes (the prominent example 
is the Yellowstone project of GM). European carmaker in many cases used new 
plants, which were set up in the emerging markets as experimentation grounds 
in the 1990s. The same holds true for the Big Three, as was mentioned, in their 
modular plant approach for Brazil such as the Campo Largo project of Chrysler, 
the Amazon project of Ford and the Blue Macaw project of General Motors 
(Posthuma 2001; Salerno/Diaz 2002; Parente/Kutabe 2001). In the meantime, 
the American carmakers have also implemented modular plant concepts in 
North America. 
There are different variants of the approach of modular supplier-integrated 
production sites: 
– Supplier parks (Fiat Melfi, Ford Saarlouis, Nissan Sunderland, Renault 
Sandouville and many others); 
– OEM/supplier Condominia (suppliers under the OEM roof) – Skoda, etc.; 
– the consortium approach – Volkswagen Resende; Smart – Hambach. 
Although it is not the most far-reaching regarding the integration of suppliers, 
the supplier park model has turned is the model most widely followed. Table 3 
lists 35 supplier parks in Western Europe in 2002 (Automobil-Produktion April 
2002, p. 122; cf. also Larsson 2001 who reports 19 supplier parks in 1999). 
Table 3: Supplier Parks in Western Europe 1999 
Location Manufacturer Status 
Ingolstadt/Germany Audi Ten suppliers in park 
Neckarsulm/Germany Audi Eleven suppliers in park 
Wackersdorf/Germany BMW Ten suppliers in park 
Regensburg/Germany BMW Utility service centre/under con-struction 
Leipzig/Germany BMW Under construction 
Sindelfingen/Germany DaimlerChrysler Ready 
Rastatt/Germany DaimlerChrysler Ten suppliers in park 
Untertürkheim/Germany DaimlerChrysler Aggregate plant, ready 
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Location Manufacturer Status 
Mannheim/Germany DaimlerChrysler Ready 
Melfi/Italy Fiat 18 suppliers 
Köln/Germany Ford 12 suppliers 
Genk/Belgium Ford Ready 
Dagenham/Great Britain Ford Aggregate plant, ready 
Saarlouis/Germany Ford Nine suppliers in park 
Valencia/Spain Ford 28 suppliers in park 
Antwerpen/Belgium GM/Opel Ready 
Bochum/Germany GM/Opel Being planned 
Rüsselsheim/Germany GM/Opel 40 suppliers in park 
Ellesmere Port/Great Britain GM/Vauxhall Three suppliers in park 
Halewood/Great Britain Jaguar 15 suppliers in park 
Hambach/France MCC 13 suppliers in park 
Sandouville/France Renault Five suppliers in park 
Trollhattan/Sweden Saab Ready 
Martorell/Spain Seat Nine suppliers in park 
Abrera/Spain Seat 26 suppliers in park 
Brüssel/Belgium Volkswagen Seven suppliers in park 
Dresden/Germany Volkswagen Ready 
Mosel/Germany Volkswagen 13 suppliers in park 
Wolfsburg/Germany Volkswagen Ready 
Wolfsburg/Germany Volkswagen Ready 
Bratislava/Slovakia Volkswagen Ready 
Pamela/Portugal Volkswagen Eleven suppliers in park 
Hannover/Germany Volkswagen Commercial vehicles being planned 
Torslanda/Sweden Volvo Eight suppliers in park 
Gent/Belgium Volvo Seven suppliers in park 
Source: Automobil-Produktion (April 2002, p. 122) 
In order to reap the benefits of proximity with their major tier-1 suppliers, many 
OEMs have made arrangements with the local authorities to create supplier 
parks adjacent to or at least nearby their assembly plants. Often the infrastruc-
ture investments are carried jointly between the OEMs, suppliers, investor 
groups and the local community in the form of public-private partnerships. 
After learning from the experiences of Nissan in Sunderland, Fiat in Melfi, 
etc., Ford of Europe seems to have developed a lead model for such supplier 
parks. It aims at an “agile complexity management” (Schardt 2001) at the OEM 
plant and the suppliers. It allows an optimisation of just-in-time and in-sequence 
delivery and material handling. It also minimises investment in production as-
sets. Last, but not least it allows avoidance of lock-in effects. The following are 
key elements of this supplier park concept: 
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– Investment and planning are done by an external investor; 
– building structures are designed according to supplier needs; 
– buildings are leased by suppliers, contract duration corresponds with supply 
contract duration; 
– supplier and OEM plant are linked via a bridge conveyor; 
– pay-on-production: The OEM pays the supplier on a piece-by-piece basis 
as parts arrive at the point of assembly. 
Ford took the pay-on-production idea a bit further with the refurbishing of the 
Cologne plant for the production of the Fiesta. Two equipment suppliers operate 
the body shop at Cologne in a joint venture with Ford of Europe. The two sup-
pliers, body-welding machinery maker Comau and Kuka, own and maintain the 
equipment. Ford workers carry out the assembly operations. 
More recently, the Big Three have opened up supplier parks at some of 
their refurbished assembly plants in the USA. In August 2002, Ford opened its 
first supplier park adjacent to the Chicago assembly plant. At least 12 suppliers 
are expected to operate in the park when production begins in 2004. Suppliers 
will lease space in buildings owned by a joint venture between Ford and a Chi-
cago land developer (cf. Automotive News, August 5, 2002). Another example 
of supplier parks of American OEMs is the Jeep Liberty assembly plant of Daim-
lerChrysler in Toledo. 
In addition, Nissan in its new assembly plant in the USA in Canton, Missis-
sippi, follows the supplier park approach. At Nissan in Japan, the Canton plant 
is regarded as a learning ground for the company’s main operations in Japan. 
The condominium approach goes a step further. In this case, suppliers op-
erate under the same factory roof as the OEMs. Due to outsourcing and dever-
ticalisation, OEMs often do not need the gigantic space of their legacy factories 
any longer and therefore offer part of their factory space to suppliers. Examples 
for this approach can be found, for instance, at Skoda in its huge factory in 
Mlada Boleslav. In view of industrial relations problems with different wage lev-
els and the presence of worker interest representation under the same roof, this 
approach has remained the exception, however. 
While the condominium approach can be found in Japanese plants, such as 
Nissan’s Tochigi plant in Japan, union representation issues, set limits to this 
approach in Germany and in the USA. 
The consortium approach goes a step further still. This approach has been 
pursued in some cases where new factories were set up with suppliers sharing 
the initial investment for the plant and operating part of the plant under their own 
responsibilities. Examples for this are Volkswagen’s truck plant in Resende, 
Brazil, and the Smart assembly plant in Hambach, France. At Resende, the 
“modular consortium” in terms of employment leaves the OEM, Volkswagen, in 
a minority position. Out of the 1.850 people working at the VW truck plant in 
Resende in February 2002, 460 were Volkswagen employees, 650 are from the 
nine partners of the modular consortium and subcontractors employed 740. 
Volkswagen employees were not involved in the assembly operations, they 
have concentrated on quality assurance, coordination and related tasks. 
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The Achilles heel of such a set up lies in the production system of the sup-
pliers and their control over quality and delivery from their own suppliers, and in 
the industrial relations situation. The smallest conflict at one of the suppliers 
immediately affects the whole operation. In view of this conflict potential, at Re-
sende, all employees are represented by the same union and, as a conse-
quence, remuneration for given qualification levels are the same. Also at the 
Hambach plant issues of pay and working conditions are coordinated by a 
committee representing the companies of the consortium. Thus the consortium 
approach, similar to the condominium approach, does not lend itselves to at-
tempts of benefiting from pay differences between OEMs and suppliers. 
The experience at the Smart plant in Hambach where twelve systems part-
ners work together with MCC, the DaimlerChrysler affiliate responsible for the 
Smart car brand, also has shown the difficulties of finding a fair and robust fi-
nancial solution. Investments in the case of these plants were calculated based 
on a yearly production volume of 180,000 cars. The contracts between MCC 
and the suppliers had a clause, which obliged MCC to pay “compensation” to its 
systems’ partners in case actual production volume remains below this target. 
However, actual production volume remained far below the planned volume. 
Consequently, MCC had to pay a considerable amount to compensate its part-
ners in the year 2000. After this experience, MCC insisted on renegotiation of 
the contracts that now have a “risk-and-revenue” clause according to which 
suppliers have to share the risks of market volatility in the future. 
The integrated production-site concepts largely follow Japanese examples 
and the essential features of their operation (just in time, in sequence etc.) have 
been developed in Japan long before already. The European and American 
carmakers carried some of the basic ideas further and used their new plants in 
emerging markets often as experimental ground. This is particularly true for 
Brazil where, as Parente and Kutabe noticed, “… particular firm characteristics, 
local conditions and operating environment (…) seemed to have accelerated 
the convergence of modularity and supply chain management, leading to the 
adoption of modular strategies in the automobile industry” (ibid.: 32). With the 
new concepts, logistical and operational management aspects learned from 
Japan can be implemented while, economically, risks of lock-in effects can be 
reduced.  
6.2 Cooperation at the Point of Product Development 
The “model-offensive” of European carmakers in the 1990s – with the 
multiplication in the number of niche cars – could not be handled by the OEMs 
alone. In addition to shifting the production and increasingly also the product 
development tasks to suppliers the OEMs also rely more and more on 
independent engineering service firms. Therefore, firms like Edag, AVL, 
Bertrandt, Rücker, CADFORM, MSX Engineering, etc. quickly grew in size and 
a number of them developed full-car development capabilities ranging from 
styling and concept development to the building and testing of prototypes. Table 
4 shows the rapid growth of these companies in Germany in recent years. 
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Table 4: Growth of Engineering Service Companies in Germany  
1997-2000 (Selected Examples) 
 Number of  
Employees 1997 
Number of  
Employees 2000 
Edag Engineering + Design AG 1.650  3.600  
AVL Deutschland GmbH   1.900  
Bertrandt AG ca. 750  2.807  
Rücker AG 600  1.700  
IVM Automotive Engineering GmbH 1.200  1.700  
IAV GmbH Ingenieurgesellschaft 
Auto und Verkehr 
780  1.900  
FEV Motorentechnik GmbH 1.000  750  
GIF GmbH 120  250  
Genion Fahrzeugtechnik GmbH 51  104  
CADFORM – MSX Engineering 
GmbH 
  200  
csi GmbH 25  70  
Scala Design GmbH 15  20  
Source: Erig (2001/2002), Vol. 2 
In the 1990s, the proportion of external R&D for OEMs increased to between 10 
and 20%. At the same time engineering service firms play an essential role in 
substituting for capability deficits of the suppliers, which now had to cope with a 
larger development responsibility. Engineering service firms were also key in 
developing the modules for the suppliers (cf. Blöcker 2001; Rentmeister 1999). 
Thus engineering service companies play an increasingly important role in 
the network of actors involved in new product development. Most ES compa-
nies specialise in either product or process engineering, and in either the pro-
pulsion system or the body-interior parts of the car. In view of the shortening of 
time-to-market requirements and in order to compensate competence gaps of 
suppliers, engineering service firms often become third partners in the coopera-
tion between suppliers and OEMs for new product development (cf. Volpato 
2002). Empirical studies show a very complex picture of interactions between 
the various actors in these networks. Thus in a recent study, Jürgens et al. 
(2000) found three different situations of network development activities:  
– Joint development activities on site, at the car maker’s engineering complex 
and within the framework of its cross-functional engineering teams; 
– joint development activities at the site of the engineering service firms, with 
visiting engineers from carmakers and from the carmakers’ first tier suppli-
ers and, in some case, also suppliers of process equipment; 
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– joint development of modules and components between two and more 
OEM suppliers, joining at one of the companies including, in some cases, 
process equipment makers and engineering service firms. 
In general, communication and cooperation issues have become an increas-
ingly important area of learning and capability building. As in the supply chain 
for car production, the process chains for car development have become more 
fragmented and actors are specialising on specific roles. The emerging new 
actor constellation is shown in figure 5. 
Figure 5: Network for car development (actors and relationships) 
Car Maker
Development Dept.
Integrated Engineering
Service Firms
(broad range of services)
Small Engineering
Service Firms
(specialized services, e.g. design, 
calculation, rapid prototyping
Systems Supplier
(e.g. door modules,
front end etc.)
Parts and Components
Suppliers
(e.g. plastic parts, 
sheet metal parts etc.)
Consultants
(e.g. project management,
simultaneous engineering, TQM)
Software Service Firms
(e.g. CAD systems)  
Source: Rentmeister (1999: 13) 
6.3 Cooperation at the Interface between the OEMs and the Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SME) 
Networking between small and medium enterprises is another area of develop-
ments, which seem to reflect European distinctiveness. Networks of suppliers 
„must be defined as an operative concept, involving both hierarchical and coor-
dination mechanisms, in dynamic environments.” (Camacho 2001: 4) 
A couple of factors have fostered this development in the European context: 
– The existence of “industrial districts” in a number of European regions 
(around Turin, Stuttgart etc.); 
– industrial policies by state actors on different levels (European, national, 
regional); 
– the policy of OEM to avoid becoming dependent on “mega-suppliers”, a 
publicly stated concern of OEMs. 
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The network approach currently pursued in numerous European regions is 
based on Michael Porter’s theory of clusters (cf. Porter 1998). The political sup-
port of networking constitutes a new pillar for strategies, aiming at “Structural 
change and adjustment in European manufacturing” (Liikanen 2000). In view of 
new strategies and structures of multinational enterprises (MNEs) the European 
Commission sees the need to protect small and medium enterprises and re-
gards clustering as a means to achieve this goal. “At present an increasing 
number of MNEs are becoming integrated Europe-wide organisations. They 
build, and operate through, production and subcontracting networks that span 
the whole of Europe … The progress in information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) has made access to networks easier for all firms. Nevertheless, it 
remains true that larger firms have more possibilities to build and participate in 
such networks throughout Europe. … Policy needs to focus, therefore on local 
impediments to investment and on the difficulties of SMEs to build and to par-
ticipate in European-wide networks.” (Liikanen 2000: 10f.) 
Figure 6: Networking: European Best-Practice Regions 
– Austria/Upper Austria: Automobile cluster, established in 1998, is experi-
encing a rapid growth. In late 1999 the network has more than 270 mem-
bers “for which a wide range of services is provided”. 
– Austria/Styria: ACstyria, established as a pilot cluster in 1996, “earmarking 
Styria as a top automotive region in Europe”. 
– France/Nord-Pas de Calais: one of the top automotive regions. “The re-
gional car manufacturers, the technology poles and some of the leading 
automotive companies have started promising network initiatives. Lacking 
a common interface and in absence of a focus on small suppliers, these, 
however, have remained isolated from each other.” 
– Germany/North Rhine-Westphalia: Verbundinitiative Automobil NRW, set 
up in 1993 “to strengthen the competitiveness of the regional automotive 
suppliers”. 
– Great Britain/Wales: Welsh auto forum, set up 1998 as a collective body 
for the self-help of automotive suppliers. 
– Italy/Piemonte: Unified platform for regional technology network is still 
missing. 
– Spain/Basque Country: Technology networking is co-ordinated by the 
cluster grouping ACICAE (Agruparación Cluster Industrias Componentes 
Automoción Euskadi), established in 1992.* 
* “Being a grouping of 27 leading automotive suppliers the well-structured organiza-
tion is advancing the interests of the suppliers in various fields, including technol-
ogy. The ACIAE also acts as an interest representation of the suppliers vis-à-vis 
the regional government and the car manufacturers.” (Cf. Alaez et al. 2001.) 
Source: Based on Agiplan (1999: 2) 
Thus, regional networks are supported by national or European funds. They 
provide information and communication services to its members; provide sup-
port of cooperation projects, qualification programmes, public relations and 
marketing. Based on “best European practices” (Agiplan 1999: 89ff), the Euro-
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pean Commission Enterprise Directorate-General (2001) promotes regional 
networking and gives a detailed information on the basic organizational princi-
ples for networks. Figure 6 lists the European “best practice regions” of 1999. 
European policies aiming at the strengthening of SME is supported by 
OEMs, which try to avoid depending on “mega-suppliers”. The cluster approach 
shall be illustrated by the example of the Automobile Cluster (AC) of Upper-
Austria, which seems to be one of the most successful clusters.  
AC describes itself as the largest cross-industry automotive network of Aus-
tria. It is aiming at strengthening the international competitiveness, innovative-
ness and cooperation of its partnering firms, in particular small and medium 
firms. It is supported by EU (European Commission 2000a) and Austrian funds 
(Zukunftsfonds des Landes Oberösterreich; this money comes from privatisa-
tion of state companies). It is a branch of a regional development and marketing 
firm (cf. www.automobil-cluster.at). 
The catalogue of AC member companies is entitled “The virtual cluster 
auto” claiming all-round capability to make a car. In fact, in terms of revenues 
and employees the cluster equals a full-size OEM. Total turnover of the cluster 
is 155 billion ATS; thereof 86 billion in the area of automotive. The cluster has 
59,000 employees. 
The majority of supplier firms in the network are small and medium: 71% of 
AC partners employ less than 250 employees. An important element of the clus-
ter approach as it has evolved in Europe over the last year – not least with EU 
support – is its internal organisation and existence of a support team. The Sup-
port activities provided by an AC team are in five areas: 
– Information and communication: a data bank of the AC partner teams, in-
formation on network activities, plant visits, etc.; 
– qualification: various activities for further education, workshops, inter-
company learning, study tours, etc.; 
– cooperation: cooperation projects between firms and technology transfer 
institutions; 
– marketing and public relations: information material, fares, presentation of 
partner companies at OEM and tier 1 companies; 
– internationalisation support: networking with foreign automobile initiatives; 
response to requests of foreign companies concerning cluster firms, etc.; 
– support of cooperation projects encompassing minimum three AC partners 
concerning costs for personnel, external services and other. 
The overall aim of the cluster approach is to develop capabilities at small and 
medium enterprises and link them up to the developments described before (cf. 
Grammel et al. 2000). While similar approaches of supporting small and me-
dium companies can also be observed in the other triad regions (cf. Whittacker 
1997 describing the development of the Ota Ward near Tokyo, and Best 2001 
referring to initiatives in the USA), the development of an active approach of 
organising small and medium companies on a regional basis in order to com-
pete with global players seems to be very much a European speciality. 
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7. Conclusions 
To what extent does it then make sense to speak of a distinct European auto 
approach? The analysis has shown a number of factors supporting the hy-
pothesis of a European distinctiveness. The following short list summarises the 
main findings in this paper:  
(1) We can indeed observe a distinct European concern to align industrial 
policy aiming to increase competitiveness and foster ecological goals with ele-
ments of a social policy, aiming to increase social cohesion, social dialogue, 
and a human oriented system of work with worker participation, a high empha-
sis on skills and trust relationship. There is nothing equivalent to this approach 
in the other two regions of the triad. 
(2) European and national level regulation have fostered the development 
of a particular European market segment of Diesel cars that – similar to the light 
truck segment in the USA and the mini cars in Japan – has opened up regional 
specific growth opportunities which partially explain the positive development of 
Europe’s auto industry at the turn of the century. 
(3) European level policies aiming at non-Taylorist production alternatives 
so far have not resulted in a clearly different, European approach towards pro-
duction. The strong anti-Taylorist tradition, especially in Scandinavia, has had 
the unintended effect, however, to induce production planners in European auto 
companies to develop modularisation concepts, which were to play a key role in 
the restructuring of the supplier sector in the 1990s. 
(4) The industry structure of independent and innovative suppliers sup-
ported the development of specialisation patterns different from the pyramid 
structure found in Japan. Instead, network structures of specialised independent 
companies emerged as the basis of the new European auto system in the late 
1990s. 
(5) The existence of a large specialised firm structure of small and medium 
companies supports the tendency of specialisation in outsourcing. The Euro-
pean industry has at its disposal a large specialised firm structure for shared 
product development and production tasks. The mostly small and medium com-
panies in turn rely on an infrastructure of public research and training institu-
tions. 
In conclusion the European approach taken in the course of the restructur-
ing of the supplier industry in the 1990s gave Europe a lead in the development 
of specific capabilities related to cross-company and interorganisational coop-
eration. If the future lies in the increased specialisation of actors in the value 
chain, the European automotive industry seems to be particularly well posi-
tioned in terms of structures and capabilities. 
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